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In this essay I develop quantum contextuality as a potential candidate for
Wheeler’s universal regulating principle, arguing — contrary to Wheeler — that
this ultimately implies that ‘bit’ comes from ‘it.’
All I did this week was rearrange bits on the internet. I had no real impact on
the physical world.
— Dilbert
I. IT AND BIT
In his Oersted Medal acceptance address in 1983, John Wheeler expressed his view that
the primary task of what he called the “coming third era of physics” was the identification
of a universal regulating principle arising from a “regularity based on chaos, of ‘law without
law’ ” [19]. This third era of physics will clearly require a radical reconsideration of many
of our most cherished ideas. Indeed, such reconsiderations have, in recent years, led to
the development of categorical quantum mechanics [1, 2], the derivation of physical laws
from ordering relations such as posets [5, 13, 14], and the introduction of topos theory to
theoretical physics [6, 12], to name but a few. In the latter approach, Do¨ring and Isham
have even attempted to answer Heidegger’s amorphous question, ‘What is a Thing?’ [6, 11].
Indeed, what is a ‘thing’ and from whence does it arise? Several approaches to this
problem have been proposed. Of particular interest is the aforementioned work of Do¨ring
and Isham [6] and that of Wheeler [20] himself. Both question what is seemingly one of the
unassailably solid pillars upon which modern science is constructed: real numbers and, most
notably, their continuity as physical fact. Do¨ring and Isham have suggested that physical
quantities need not be real-valued [6]. Their argument against the supposition of real-
valuedness for physically measurable quantities is partly based on a line of reasoning that
connects measuring devices with continuous, smooth manifolds and equates such manifolds
with ‘classicality.’ Wheeler is more blunt; he flatly states “no continuum” [20].
The concept of a discrete physical reality is a very old idea. The early atomists of ancient
India and Greece theorized that nature consisted of two fundamental concepts: atom, which
was the presence of something, and void which was the presence of nothing. The former
represented physical reality in its most basic form. In the context of modern physics, these
concepts have a deep relation to the dual notions of space and time: anything that is
physically real occupies space and time, while the complete absence of any such occupation
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2corresponds to a vacuum1. In order to ‘occupy’ space and time, a physical ‘thing’ must
generally possess measurable properties or characteristics that provide a means by which
that ‘occupation’ may be measured. As philosopher Eugene Gendlin has noted, Heidegger’s
notion of ‘thing’ is really an explanatory approach that “renders whatever we study as some
thing in space, located over there, subsisting separate from . . . us” [10]. In other words, a
‘thing’ occupies space and time.
Feynman took the position that anything that possesses energy and momentum2 is physi-
cally real, i.e. particles and fields3 [9]. More generally, Eddington viewed particles and fields
as carriers of sets of “variates” [8]. Mathematically, such variates are manifest in symme-
tries that represent degrees of freedom of the overall state space of a particle or field with
each symmetry making up a sub-space. These symmetries, very generally, provide various
means by which particles and fields, along with their configurations and interactions, may
be distinguished from one another. For the purposes of this essay, I shall refer generally to
anything that ‘occupies’ space and time as matter-energy.
Distinguishability, of course, is at the heart of information. As Schumacher and West-
moreland note, “Information is the ability to distinguish reliably between possible alterna-
tives” [16]. In this sense, information is encoded in the properties of the particles. Or, as
Wheeler saw it, the act of distinguishing one alternative from another actually gives rise to
the particles themselves, hence his use of the term “participatory universe.” His approach
began with the working hypothesis that
every it—every particle, every field of force, even the spacetime continuum
itself—derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely—even if in
some contexts indirectly—from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no ques-
tions, binary choices, bits. [20]
Do¨ring and Isham formalize this in the notion of a topos which is a type of mathematical
structure known as a category. One way to think of a category is as a set of objects that
has some connective pattern between the objects [18]. Another way to describe a category
is as a mathematical structure consisting of objects and arrows [3]. A topos contains two
special objects: a state object s, and a quantity-value object v. A given physical quantity q
is represented by an arrow q : s → v in the topos. As Do¨ring and Isham note, “[w]hatever
meaning can be ascribed to the concept of the ‘value’ of a physical quantity is encoded in (or
derived from) this representation” [6]. In this way a ‘thing’ is then somewhat loosely defined
as a bundle of properties wherein these properties refer to values of physical quantities.
This is more abstract than Eddington’s view as it is not at all clear from this whether it
necessarily implies an occupation of space and time. From Wheeler’s perspective, these
quantities represented the answers to questions we put to nature. At the most fundamental
level, he believed that all such questions could be reduced to those for which ‘yes’ or ‘no’
were the only possible answers and would thus be represented by a binary digit, i.e. a
1It is worth noting that in quantum theory the vacuum may be represented by a quantum state |vac〉. This
would seem to blur the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘nothingness,’ but we will leave that discussion for
another time.
2We will not concern ourselves in this essay with the nature of momentum and energy.
3Quantum field theory has rendered the difference between particle and field virtually meaningless: a particle
is the quantization of a field.
3bit4. Hence, it from bit, according to Wheeler, and thus all physical ‘things’ are ultimately
information-theoretic in origin.
A more formal, “rigorously qualitative” definition of information can be given in terms
of the order on a domain [15]. A domain (D,⊑) is a set of objects D together with a
partial order ⊑ that includes certain intrinsic notions of completeness and approximation
that are defined by this order. For instance, consider two objects x, y ∈ D. The statement
x ⊑ y essentially says that x contains (or carries) some (possibly all) information about
y., i.e. y is “more informative” than x [15]. For example, a Honus Wagner baseball card
contains information about Honus Wagner 5. Clearly Honus Wagner himself would be far
more informative about his life than his baseball card. In the event that x does contain the
full information about y, then x = y and x is said to be a maximal element (object) of the
domain, in which case it is an example of an ideal element. An object that is not ideal is
said to be partial. So, given a domain that includes both Honus Wagner and his baseball
card, Honus Wagner would be a maximal element while his baseball card would be partial.
A measurement is then understood as a particular type of mapping on a domain that
formalizes the notion of information content. Specifically, for a map to be considered a
measurement and thus a measure of information content, it must, at a minimum, be able
to distinguish between those elements that it claims are maximally informative (recall the
definition of information given by Schumacher and Westmoreland). The details of the for-
malism are beyond the scope of this essay, but the main point is that the formalism implies
the existence of a purely structural relationship between two different classes of informative
objects, neither of which need consist of numbers. Formally, this relationship is given by the
map µ : D → E where it is said that µ reflects properties of simpler objects E onto more
complex objects D [5]. For instance, the set of characteristics that describe Honus Wagner,
say as they appear on his baseball card, would be elements of E whereas the actual set of
characteristics that ‘are’ Honus Wagner would be elements of D. The act of looking at the
baseball card is then a measurement µ and amounts to inferring (i.e. ‘reflecting’) something
about Honus Wagner by looking at his baseball card. In a sense, then, µ is just a function
that assigns a ‘value’ to each “informative object” on a domain that measures its amount
of partiality where we understand that ‘value’ does not necessarily have to mean ‘a number’
(e.g. it could be the portrait of Honus Wagner that appears on his baseball card) [5, 15].
Given that a physical quantity q really has no meaning outside the act of measurement µ
we can view q as a specific instantiation or representation of µ where s ∈ D (s is an element
of D) and v ∈ E (v is an element of E). Combining this formalism with Wheeler’s asser-
tion that the answers to all fundamental measurement ‘questions’ are binary, a ‘bit’ is best
understood as a quantity-value object v while the numerical result embodied by the bit is
q ∈ {0, 1} (i.e. the value of q comes from the set of numbers consisting of 0 and 1).
This is a crucial distinction: a bit is not the same thing as its value. To see why,
suppose we were presented with the result of a particular measurement and the numerical
value of that result was 1. Further suppose that this is all the information we have about
the measurement. We cannot, with certainty, say that 1 is the value of a bit since it could
4The first use of the word ‘bit’ in the sense of a binary digit was in Claude Shannon’s seminal 1948 paper on
information theory in which he ascribed the origin of the term to John Tukey who had written a memo on
which the term ‘binary digit’ had been contracted to ‘bit’ [17].
5Famously, the T206 Honus Wagner card, distributed between 1909 and 1911, is the most expensive trading
card in history, one having sold in 2007 for $2.8 million.
4equally well be the value of a ‘trit’ (that is anything that may exist in one of only three
mutually exclusive states) or any other ‘-it’, for that matter. In order for us to know that
we have been given the value of a bit, we must know that the domain of the quantity-value
object is [0, 1] ∈ N where N is the set of all natural numbers6. Hence, a bit (and any other
‘-it’) is really a domain.
Definition 1 (Bit) A ‘bit’ is any instantiation of the domain [0, 1] ∈ N in which the values
of the domain represent mutually exclusive7 states.
Information, as defined by Schumacher and Westmoreland, may then be quantified by the
probability PS(q) of successfully determining q.
II. INFORMATION CONTENT
Eddington referred to knowledge obtained from the act of measurement as a posteriori
knowledge [8]. Any fore-knowledge of a system prior to such an act is a priori. For example,
prior to opening a pack of baseball trading cards, we fully expect that the pack will only
contain baseball trading cards as opposed to trading cards for some other sport. Once
the pack has been opened and the cards examined, we now know exactly which cards are
contained within. The knowledge that the pack contains only baseball cards is a priori
whereas the knowledge that the pack, for example, contains a Honus Wagner card is a
posteriori.
Technically, Eddington referred to a priori knowledge as any knowledge that is derived
from a study of the actual procedure of measurement [8]. In that sense, baseball cards are
less illustrative than quantum states. Consider the quantum state
|ψa′〉 =
∑
a′
ca′ |a
′〉
where ca′ is a complex number and |a
′〉 represents a set of basis vectors for some spin axis a′.
The state, |ψa′〉, represents a state of a priori knowledge about an element of the universe
since it is not the result of a measurement but rather some observation about the system
and what sorts of measurements on that system are possible. This is analogous to knowing
that a pack of trading cards contains baseball cards, but not knowing which specific cards
it contains.
Now suppose that we perform a measurement, Sz, on this state such that |a
′〉 = Sz |ψa′〉 =
+~
2
|z+〉. In other words, we are supposing that our measurement of the spin along the z-
axis yields a value of +~/2 with certainty. In this case, the state |a′〉 represents a state of
a posteriori knowledge about an element of the universe because it provides information
about the actual state of the system, not just the possible state or states of the system.
What is the origin of a priori knowledge? How do we know that |a′〉 represents a spin
state as opposed to, say, an energy state or momentum state? Analogously, how do we
know that a pack of trading cards specifically contains baseball cards? In the latter (and
6Again, this notation is meant to formalize the notion that the only values that q may take are 0 and 1.
7The requirement of mutual exclusivity is used to distinguish a ‘bit’ from a ‘qubit’ where the latter allows
for superpositions of 0 and 1.
5purely classical) case, it is clear that some sort of ‘measurement’ (in a loose sense) had to have
taken place, i.e. the package presumably has some identifying characteristics on it in order to
differentiate it from other types of trading cards. Reading the package essentially constitutes
an act of measurement. Thus there is really a sequence of processes that leads to maximal
knowledge of a system. If we start with a complete lack of knowledge such that our sequence
of measurements could lead us to literally any final result — a Honus Wagner baseball card, a
fifty-seven-year-old elephant, or a sixteen-inch diameter pizza — each measurement reduces
the range of possibilities from a nearly infinite number down to just one in the end. Thus,
every time we make a measurement, we further refine our knowledge of the system, increasing
the amount of information we have collected and decreasing the amount of information that
we lack.
We quantify the lack of information via statistical entropy since it is zero when the state
is exactly known. Specifically, given an object x ∈ D and a measurement µ : D → E, the
Shannon entropy is given as [5, 15]
µx = −
n∑
i=1
xi log xi with x ⊑ y ⇒ µx ≥ µy
where for some value n = N , x = y and µx = µy. So if µ : D → E is a measurement and x is
an object that it measures, then the mathematical statement µx ∈ max(E) ⇒ x ∈ max(D)
says that when µx reaches its maximum value, then we have obtained as much information
as we can about x. Thus, if s ≡ y and v ≡ x, as our knowledge of the value object v
increases, it approaches the maximal element (the state object s) which is mathematically
written v → s. Simultaneously the entropy decreases such that µv → µs and µ is said to be
monotone. Note that, whereas entropy is a measure of information content and probability,
in the manner described above, is a measure of information, subject to a few ‘moderate’
hypotheses, information behaves in the same manner as its content [5].
As an example, consider a jigsaw puzzle that contains a binary message that is only
decipherable when the puzzle has been completed where on each puzzle piece is printed the
value of exactly one bit (i.e. a 0 or a 1). We may represent the state of the puzzle’s message
as s. Each time we place a puzzle piece represented as vi, the partially completed puzzle
represents a different value object, v and we gain one new bit, qn, of information. When we
have placed the final piece, n = N in which case we have obtained maximal knowledge of
the message and µv will have reached a minimum (in fact it should be zero unless we are
missing a piece of the puzzle).
In classical physics, we typically assume that if we are armed with a priori knowledge
about a system, all a posteriori knowledge about that system may be inferred. In other
words, in such a system, while N may (or may not) be infinite, there may a threshold vmin
such that if vmin ≤ v, s may be predicted with near certainty. For example, it may be that
we can accurately predict the puzzle’s message with only some fraction of the pieces having
been assembled. As another example, suppose that the information about the state of a
system is fully encoded in the fraction 5
6
= 0.83¯. Clearly knowledge of just one significant
digit is not enough information to predict the state with anywhere near certainty since, for
example, 0.8 = 4
5
. While perfect certainty in this example is impossible since 5
6
is a non-
terminating decimal fraction, we can at least establish a limit such that, at some point, we
may say with confidence that v ≈ s (i.e. at some point we can be fairly certain that the
state is 5
6
.
6A universe whose future states may be predicted with certainty based on a complete
knowledge of its prior states may be said to be physically deterministic. We may phrase
the condition corresponding to physical determinism in a more rigorous and mathematical
manner in terms of state objects and quantity-value objects as follows.
Condition 1 (Physical determinism) Let u ≡ s be the ideal element on the domain of
physical measurements that provide information about the universe. Then, if u is static and
either N is finite or u is predictable then, vmin ≤ v ⇒ v → u.
A hypothetically omniscient being who happens to be in possession of qmin ≤ qn bits, where
qmin : u→ vmin (i.e. possesses enough bits of information about the universe to fully predict
its future states), is known as Laplace’s demon.
One of the assumptions of physical determinism is that some properties are considered
to be immutable — once a Honus Wagner baseball card, always a Honus Wagner baseball
card. This is not without its problems as it implies that µv → µu, i.e. as we obtain
more and more information about the universe, its entropy should decrease. The second
law of thermodynamics tells us, of course, that the exact opposite is actually happening
and as Eddington famously said, “if your theory is found to be against the second law of
thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest
humiliation” [7]. Something is clearly amiss.
The problem lies in the seemingly innocuous assumption that by increasing our knowledge
of a physical system we will necessarily arrive at a full description of the system, i.e. that,
as n→ N , it must be that v → s. For this to be the case, s would have to be determinable.
Consider once again the jigsaw puzzle containing a binary message. For s to be determinable,
it must be static (e.g. the message cannot change as we assemble the puzzle since, if it did,
the pieces would need to be reorganized) and either N would have to be finite (e.g. the
puzzle would have to contain a finite number of pieces) or s would have to be predictable in
some manner (e.g. the message would have to have a predictable pattern). While in some
cases s may not be determinable with perfect certainty, as I noted previously, in some cases
we can establish a limit whereby we may say with some degree of confidence that v ≈ s.
This is frequently the case in classical systems. To use an old adage, “close only counts in
horseshoes and hand grenades” — and classical physics. Of course things become a bit more
difficult at the quantum level.
III. CONTEXTUALITY
Given two objects x, y ∈ D, the statement x  y is read “x approximates y” 8. It means
that x carries some essential information about y where we can think of ‘essential’ as being
synonymous with ‘indispensable.’ In other words, while x may not carry all the information
about y, it carries information that is necessary. For instance, in the jigsaw puzzle example,
there may be certain bits of the message that are indispensable in order for it to be read
or comprehended. Any piece that has the value of an indispensable bit printed on it would
then be essential.
8The notation ≪ is standard but, given the more general audience of this essay, I have adopted  so as to
clearly distinguish it from the usual meaning of ≪ in inequalities.
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FIG. 1: Each box represents a measurement of the spin for a spin-1
2
particle along some axis with
the top output indicating that the state is aligned (+) with the measurement axis, and the bottom
output indicating that the state is anti-aligned (−) with the measurement axis. Red and blue
lights on the top simply indicate to the experimenter which of the two results is obtained (e.g. red
might indicate aligned and blue might indicate anti-aligned).
There is an inherent context embedded in the statement x  y. Consider three objects,
x, y, z ∈ D and suppose that x  y. Also suppose that y ⊑ z. This means that x car-
ries essential information about y and y carries some (not necessarily essential) information
about z. In order for us to conclude from this that x  z, we would need to know that the
statement y ⊑ z is being made in the same context as x  y. We understand ‘context’ to
mean a ‘setting’ within which we make a statement. The results of classical measurements
are elements of continuous domains. This simply means that classical variables that cor-
respond to measurements may take a continuous (as opposed to discrete) range of values.
Approximation on continuous domains is context independent [5]. This means that for clas-
sical measurements, it is automatically true that if x  y and y ⊑ z, then x  z. So, for
instance, if a certain piece of our aforementioned jigsaw puzzle is essential, it is essential
regardless of how or where (or even when) we assemble the puzzle. Given the limitations on
space, I will refer those interested in a more basic explanation of contextuality to Ref. [4].
In quantum systems a ‘context’ is related to a measurement basis9. So mathematically
one way to describe a context is as a domain (Ω[m],⊑) where for vi, s ∈ Ω[m] and vi ⊑ s,
a specific measurement yields qi[m] : s[m] → vi[m] and m identifies the measurement basis.
For an orthonormal n-dimensional basis, we may write v1[m] ⊥ v2[m] ⊥ · · · ⊥ vn[m] where
the symbol ⊥ is used to indicate the fact that any two vi in such a basis represent mutually
exclusive results. For example, in a two dimensional basis that yields measurement values
q1 and q2, we have q1 : s→ v1 and q2 : s→ v2 where v1 ⊥ v2. The values q1 and q2 might be
0 and 1 or they might be +1 and −1 or even some other set of values entirely — they quite
literally correspond to something we ‘read’ off a device which means it doesn’t even have
to be a number at all (see Fig. 1 for example). The key is that the quantity-value objects
represent the more abstract elements of the basis and thus are where the orthonormality
manifests itself. Thus orthogonality provides an order-theoretic definition of what it means
for two ‘objects’ (elements, states, measurements, etc.) to truly be distinct. Any two objects
that are not orthogonal must share something in common. A more detailed mathematical
treatment may be found in Appendix A: Technical End Notes.
Now consider a sequence of three spin-measurement devices that measure along axes
a, b, and c. Note that these axes themselves do not necessarily need to be in any way
9We point those readers interested in a refresher on measurements and bases in quantum mechanics to
Ref. [16].
8perpendicular to one another. Each represents a separate orthonormal basis. Suppose, then,
that the state of the particle exiting the second device is |b−〉, as shown in Fig. 1. Standard
quantum mechanics tells us that the associated probabilities for the results of the third
measurement are Pc(+) = sin
2 1
2
θbc and Pc(−) = cos
2 1
2
θbc where θbc is the angle between the
b and c axes. So, for example, if θbc = 90
◦ then Pc(+) = Pc(−) = 0.5 which is the same result
we would find if the state of the particle exiting the second device was completely randomly
oriented. In other words, this predicts a perfectly random measurement result and means
we can’t obtain any useful information about axis b via this measurement. Mathematically
we can quantify this by writing s[b] ∩ s[c] = 0 which means that the state objects for the
particle in each instance share nothing in common. Conversely, if θbc = 0
◦ which means that
b = c, then it is as if we are merely confirming the second measurement: we are guaranteed
to find that the particle is in the state |c−〉. This, of course, is the exact opposite of perfect
randomness and so we can write s[b] ∩ s[c] = 1 corresponding to full knowledge of axis b.
In a sense, then, the statement s[m] ∩ s[n] quantifies contextuality and is a bit like a dot
product between two vectors with one crucial difference. Suppose that θab = θbc = 90
◦ and
that a = c, i.e. they represent the same axis. Let us suppose that the state subsequent
to the first measurement is, as in Fig. 1, |a+〉 and that the state subsequent to the second
measurement is, also as in Fig. 1, |b−〉 (in fact it doesn’t really matter if it is |b−〉 or |b+〉 as
long as the angles are as described). We already know that the probabilities for the results
of the third measurement are Pc(+) = Pc(−) = 0.5. This means that it is entirely possible
for the state subsequent to the third measurement to be |c−〉 = |a−〉. Clearly s[a]∩ s[c] = 0
even though a and c are the same axis ! Thus contextuality provides a means by which a
quantum state can essentially be ‘reset.’ Alternatively one could say that the particle has
no ‘memory’ of having been in the |a+〉 state.
Note that though the actual result of a measurement itself could be entirely random, the
basis is chosen in a purely deterministic manner i.e. we never find a measurement result in
a basis other than the one in which we choose to make the measurement. For example, if
we open a pack of baseball cards we know we won’t find that it contains playing cards (or,
in even simpler terms, you never find an orange growing on an apple tree10).
Quantum states are, of course, more complicated than classical states: they may be
represented by a density matrix as opposed to a simple number and the entries of the
density matrix may be complex. Crucially, however, the result of a quantum measurement
will always produce a result that lies in the domain of classical quantity-value objects.
For example, though a qubit may exist in some mixture of |0〉 and |1〉, when measured it
is always found to be in either |0〉 or |1〉. The key here is that quantum states may be
informationally isolated in which case they may exist in a superposition or a mixed state.
Once a measurement is made, however, they are no longer informationally isolated and any
record of the superposition or mixture is lost [16]. To put it another way, the domain of
classical states D is strictly smaller than the domain of quantum states Ω. I will write this
D ⊏ Ω where I take D ⊏ Ω to mean “D carries some, but strictly not all, information about
Ω”11. Thus a quantum measurement is a map q : Ω→ D and the von Neumann entropy
σρ = −tr(ρ log ρ)
on quantum states is thus also a measurement σ : Ω→ E where σ factors as σ = µ ◦ q and
10If you ever do, run like hell. The zombies are coming.
11This is non-standard notation that I introduce here for the sake of simplifying the presentation.
9µ : D → E is a classical measurement [5]. As the example given in Fig. 1 demonstrates,
the loss of informational isolation is intimately related to contextuality. Thus contextuality
provides for two important features in quantum states: they may be ‘reset’ and it is possible
for them to store more information than can be effectively obtained via measurement.
These features help to solve the mystery we noted before: if we are constantly learning
more and more about the universe (via measurements), why is the universe’s entropy in-
creasing? The first feature explains why the universe’s entropy is not decreasing by telling
us that, rather than gaining knowledge about the universe with each new measurement we
make, we might only hope to ‘break even’ since we essentially have to start over (in a way)
with each new measurement. The second feature, however, when combined with the first
guarantees that this is a false hope because every time the reset occurs, more information
(in the form of a superposition or mixture) about the universe is created that is then lost
in a measurement. The only way to prevent this is for the state to remain unchanged as I
noted earlier which is only possible if we never change our measurement basis. But in the
wonderful world of quantum mechanics, any transformation or interaction is essentially the
same as a measurement. Hence, contextuality directly leads to an ever-increasing entropy
for the universe, i.e. the second law of thermodynamics is a direct consequence of quantum
contextuality12 and, because u is not static, the universe as a whole must not be physically
deterministic!
IV. IT OR BIT?
These considerations then bring us back to Wheeler’s original declaration that every ‘it’
derives its very existence from ‘bits’ of information. But while the information content of
the universe is constantly increasing with each new ‘measurement’ (interaction), the matter-
energy content of the universe is known to be constant. It would seem that if Wheeler were
literally correct, this latter point should not be true. In other words, if ‘it’ truly — literally
— comes from ‘bit’ and the number of bits of information in the universe is always increasing,
why doesn’t this result in the creation of at least some new matter-energy? In other words,
even if not every new bit of information necessarily led to some new ‘it,’ it seems reasonable
to assume that at least some would.
In fact there is really nothing mysterious about the ever-increasing entropy if one takes the
Schumacher and Westmoreland definition of information literally as “the ability to distin-
guish reliably between possible alternatives” [16]. In this sense, entropy is merely a measure
of the number of possible configurations of the system and contextuality guarantees that
we are provided with an ever-increasing number of them. Thus it seems quite logical to
conclude the exact opposite of Wheeler — ‘bit’ actually comes from ‘it’ and is really a direct
consequence of quantum contextuality since it is contextuality that creates the alternatives
(and hence the need to distinguish between them) in the first place. Ironically, because
contextuality also implies that the universe is not physically deterministic, perhaps it satis-
fies Wheeler’s notion of a universal regulating principle arising from a “regularity based on
chaos, of ‘law without law’ ” [19]. Indeed, perhaps the key to understanding the universe is
lying right under our very noses.
12I suppose it is possible to take the opposite view that the second law leads to the requirement of contextuality,
but that is really a ‘chicken and egg’ type of argument.
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Appendix A: Technical end notes
Orthogonality plays such an important role here, as evidenced by the example of Fig. 1,
that it warrants a more detailed treatment.
Martin ( [15]) gives the following definition of a dcpo which is a particular type of domain
that is integral to the work presented here.
Definition 2 (dcpo) Let (P,⊑) be a partially ordered set or poset. A nonempty subset
S ⊆ P is directed if (∀x, y ∈ S)(∃z ∈ S)x, y ⊑ z. The supremum
⊔
S of S ⊆ P is the
least of its upper bounds when it exists. A dcpo is a poset in which every directed set has
a supremum.
Any continuous dcpo is an example of a domain. Now let (D,⊑) be a dcpo. For elements
x, y ∈ D we set
↑ x := {y ∈ D : x ⊑ y} and ↓ x := {y ∈ D : y ⊑ x}.
Then for some dcpo D, a pair of elements x, y ∈ D are said to be orthogonal if
µ(↑ x ∩ ↑ y) ⊆ {0}
which may be written x ⊥ y.
